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Case Note 
REMARKS, MORE REMARKS AND A GROUNDS OF 
DECISION 
One Judgment too Many? 
T T Durai v Public Prosecutor 
[2007] SGDC 334 
In May 2008, the High Court dismissed the appeal of former 
NKF CEO, T T Durai, against his conviction and sentence. 
What is little known is that one of Durai’s six grounds of 
appeal was in fact upheld. The appellate judge subsequently 
devoted nine out of 12 paragraphs of his four-page Grounds 
of Decision, to explain his reasons for doing so. Although this 
ruling did not affect the final outcome of the Durai appeal, it 
has to some extent helped to settle a question that has vexed 
criminal law practitioners in recent years. This concerns the 
legality and propriety of writing multiple judgments in a 
case. Such a practice amongst subordinate court judges was 
revealed in the Durai case to be more widespread than was 
previously thought. This note discusses the usefulness of the 
decision in the light of the uncertainty amongst lower court 
judges as to the legality of this strange practice. It also 
examines the shortcomings of the judgment in this regard. 
S Chandra MOHAN 
LLB (Hons), LLM (NUS), PhD (London);  
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); 
Practice Associate Professor, Singapore Management University. 
I.  Introduction 
1  On 11 June 2007, T T Durai, the former CEO of the National 
Kidney Foundation (“NKF”), was convicted on one charge of 
“knowingly” using, with intent to deceive NKF, an invoice which 
contained a false statement, an offence under s 6(c) of the Prevention of 592  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
Corruption Act.
1 He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for 
this offence. 
2  Durai’s petition of appeal to the High Court against his 
conviction and sentence was filed on 24 January 2008. In it he raised six 
grounds of appeal. The first five grounds were stated to be:
2 
(a)  the failure of the prosecution to establish the 
ingredients of the charge, at the close of the prosecution case; 
(b)  material “intrinsic and extrinsic” contradictions in the 
evidence of David Tan, the main prosecution witness; 
(c)  failure of the trial judge to treat the evidence of David 
Tan, an accomplice, with customary caution; 
(d)  error in law and fact by the trial judge in finding there 
was a core of “untainted evidence” from which adverse 
i n f e r e n c e s  u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o  t h e  a p p e l l a n t  w e r e  d r a w n  a n d ,  
consequently, in requiring him to give an explanation; and 
(e)  drawing adverse inferences from the appellant’s election 
to remain silent when called upon to make his defence. 
3  The sixth and last ground of appeal, the most relevant to this 
note, was against the multiple judgments written by the trial judge:
3 
The trial judge erred in law in issuing the Grounds of Decision dated 
17 December 2007 in contravention of the Criminal Procedure Code 
when he had already given his reasons for his findings in writing in the 
form of the three written Remarks dated 28 March 2007, 11 June 2007 
and 21 June 2007 comprising 45 pages. 
4  This was the only ground of appeal that was allowed by Justice 
Tay Yong Kwang who heard the appeal. Unfortunately for the appellant, 
that decision in his favour did not have the slightest effect on the final 
result of the appeal. 
                                                                        
1  Cap 241, 1985 Rev Ed. Section 6(c) provides that “if any person knowingly gives to 
an agent, or if an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any 
receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested, 
and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any 
material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead the 
principal ,he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to 
both”. 
2  Extracted from the Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant, dated 21  May 2008, 
submitted to the High Court in Magistrate’s Appeal No 126/2007/01. 
3  Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant, p 4. (2009) 21 SAcLJ  Multiple Judgments  593 
 
II.  The multiple judgments 
5  What the trial judge had done in this case was to issue a total of 
four written judgments, which he had variously described, at different 
stages of the proceedings. On 28  March 2007, he issued a nine-page 
written judgment termed “Remarks at the Close of the Prosecution’s 
Case” which contained his reasons for calling on the defence. On 
11  June 2007, he gave a 29-page written reasons for convicting the 
accused which he called “Remarks before Verdict” and on 21 June 2007, 
after sentencing the accused to three months’ imprisonment, he issued 
another nine-page written “Remarks at Sentencing”. The three 
“Remarks” contained a total of 47 pages. A final 63-page Grounds of 
Decision
4 then followed on 17 December 2007, some six months after 
the appellant had filed his notice of appeal. This was the only judgment 
that the District Judge was required by law to write.
5 
III.  The appellant’s complaint 
6  The appellant’s complaint, on appeal, was that the writing of the 
multiple judgments by the trial judge was a clear breach of s 217(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Code
6 which reads: 
No court other than the High Court, when it has recorded its 
judgment, shall alter or review the judgment. 
7  Clearly, this provision embodies the principle of functus officio 
which is “at the very core of the principle of finality”.
7 According to 
Spenser Wilkinson J, “[i]f a written judgment is delivered, it is perfected 
as soon as it is delivered and signed; if an oral judgment is delivered … 
it is perfected as soon as it has been pronounced and the effect thereof 
has been entered in the judge’s note-book and signed”.
8 
8  Section 217(2) confines the “limited circumstances” when an 
alteration or review of a judgment is permissible, to clerical errors and 
to “any other mistakes” which must be rectified before the court rises for 
the day.
9 A mistake is not “mere forgetfulness”.
10 I t  i s ,  a s  R u s s e l l   C J  
                                                                        
4 See  T T Durai v PP [2007] SGDC 334. 
5  Section 247(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) requires a 
Grounds of Decision to be made available to the appellant “when a notice of appeal 
has been lodged”. 
6  Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed. The section corresponds with s 362 of the Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code and s 278 of the Malaysian Code. 
7  Chiaw Wai Onn v PP [1997] 3 SLR 445, per Yong CJ. See also Mallal’s Criminal 
Procedure Code (Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 5th Ed, 1978) at para 9030. 
8  PP v Heng You Nang [1949] MLJ 285. 
9 See  Chiaw Wai Onn v PP [1997] 3 SLR 445 followed in Lim Teck Leng Roland v PP 
[2001] 4 SLR 61; PP v Lee Wei Zheng Winston [2002] 4 SLR 33. Rising for the day 
(cont’d on the next page) 594  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
explained in Sandford v Beal,
11 “a slip made, not by design but by 
mischance”. Obviously, a  change of heart or opinion, on further 
reflection, would not be a mistake sufficient to warrant an alteration or 
review of a previous court judgment under s 217(2) of the Code. 
9  Section 217(2) does not contemplate a court hearing and 
deciding a disputed issue as to whether a mistake was made. It applies 
only if a mistake was obvious to the court or admitted by all parties. In 
other situations, a party aggrieved by the alleged mistake should appeal 
or seek criminal revision.
12 A mistake within s 217(2) of the Code must 
be a genuine error of law or fact as, for example, in the powers of 
sentencing prescribed by a statute or in not allowing counsel to address 
the court before sentencing in accordance with prescribed procedure.
13 
Altering a sentence because a new fact has arisen and not because of a 
clerical error or mistake at the time of the sentencing process, would be 
an improper application of s 217(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
14 
10  It was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the appellant that the 
trial judge had erred in this case by supplementing his three judgments 
totalling some 43 pages, written six months earlier between March and 
June 2007, with a 63-page Grounds of Decision dated 17  December 
2007 containing “critical additions”
15 or embellishments. Consequently, 
there was a breach of s  217 of the Code to warrant appellate 
intervention. 
11  At the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal, the judge was 
persuaded, to use his own words, to “agree with the appellant that the 
District Judge should not have supplemented his 3 remarks given at 
various stages of the trial, notwithstanding his qualifier and reservation 
of a right to give ‘full grounds’”.
16 Despite the appellate judge upholding 
this ground of appeal or allowing this ground of appeal, it proved a 
pyrrhic victory for the appellant as it was held not to affect the final 
outcome of the appeal. 
                                                                                                                                
would imply that the court has attended to all its business for the day: Chiaw Wai 
Onn v PP [1997] 3 SLR 445; Chuah Gin Synn v PP [2002] 2 SLR 179. 
10  Barrow v Isaacs [1891] 1 QB 417, per Esther MR. 
11  65 LJQB 74. 
12  Virgie Rizza V Leong v PP [1998] SGHC 112 at [12] followed in PP v Oh Hu Sung 
[2003] 4 SLR 541. 
13  PP v Lee Wei Zheng Winston [2002] 4 SLR 33; Monteiro v PP [1964] MLJ 338. 
14  PP v Lee Wei Zheng Winston [2002] 4 SLR 33. 
15  Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant (Magistrate’ Appeal No 126/2007/01), dated 
21 May 2008, at para 217. 
16  Unreported Grounds of Decision dated 30 May 2008, at p 2, para 8. (2009) 21 SAcLJ  Multiple Judgments  595 
 
IV.  Previous criticisms 
12  The practice of writing multiple judgments
17 by the lower courts 
has not been considered by the Singapore High Court since the 1964 
decision of the High Court in PP v John Thien
18 when Wee Chong Jin CJ 
allowed an application to expunge the grounds of decision from the 
record in view of an earlier “brief judgment” that had been read out by 
the trial judge. However, in view of the frequency of this practice in 
recent years, it was the subject of academic examination in 2007.
19 
13  Questions as to the propriety of delivering multiple judgments 
b y  s u b o r d i n a t e  c o u r t  j u d g e s  w e r e  r a i s e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t w o  “ o r a l ”  
judgments delivered by a District Judge in PP v Velusamy Mathivanan.
20 
Better known as the CrimsonLogic case, it was concluded in the District 
Court in December 2006.
21 In that case, the trial judge had delivered a 
67-page oral judgment in open court. On the following day , he made 
available to the parties another 69-page written judgment which he 
described as an “Oral Judgment”. As in the Durai judgments entitled 
“Remarks”, the “oral” judgments contained a number of qualifiers or 
caveats by the trial judge to the effect that if there were an appeal, “he 
would elaborate on his reasons”. The matter did not proceed to appeal 
thus making the writing of a further Grounds of Decision, unlike in the 
Durai case, unnecessary. 
14  The  CrimsonLogic judgments prompted the author in 
September 2007 to review the applicable legislative provisions and case 
law in both Singapore and Malaysia and to examine both the legality 
                                                                        
17  Undefined in the Criminal Procedure Code, but the word “judgment” indicates the 
final order in a trial terminating in an acquittal or conviction: Marzuki bin Mokhtar 
v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 155; Balasingham v PP [1959] MLJ 59 and Lim Teck Leng Roland 
v PP [2001] 4 SLR 61. For purposes of s 217 of the Code, it also appears to cover a 
sentence of the court: PP v Yap Thiang Wah [1992] 1 MLJ 206; Low Ah Thit v PP 
[1992] 2 CLJ 1223; Choo Teck Soon v PP [1954] MLJ 63; Ooi Sim Yim v PP [1990] 
1 MLJ 88. 
18  Unreported MA No 58 of 1964 briefly noted in [1964] MLJ ci. In that case, Wee 
Chong Jin CJ allowed an application to expunge from the record the Grounds of 
Decision of a District Judge in the light of his earlier brief oral judgment. This was 
followed in Low Ah Thit v PP [1992] CLJ 1223 and PP v Johannes Van Damme 
[1993] SGHC 90. See also Goh Lai Wak v PP [1994] 1 SLR 748. The Court of 
Appeal had occasion to consider the matter in respect of High Court decisions 
some 15 years ago in Goh Lai Wak v PP and Anyanwu v PP [1994] 2 SLR 46. 
19  See S  Chandra Mohan, “The CrimsonLogic Case: When is a Judgment Not a 
Judgment” Law Gazette, September 2007, 23. 
20  DAC 47935/2005, unreported, better known as the CrimsonLogic case as all the 
accused were employees of CrimsonLogic, an IT systems provider. The case was 
concluded in December 2006. 
21  For a detailed examination of this case in reference to multiple judgments, see 
S  Chandra Mohan, “The CrimsonLogic Case: When is a Judgment Not a 
Judgment” Law Gazette, September 2007, 23. 596  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
and propriety of the practice amongst lower court judges of writing 
multiple judgments in a case. The review concluded that existing 
legislation and abundant judicial authorities in both Singapore and 
Malaysia disapproved the writing of multiple judgments. The paper 
suggested some reasons for the emergence of the recent practice of 
delivering multiple judgments in the lower courts and expressed the 
hope that the High Court would remedy the situation at the earliest 
opportunity. This article was published in the Singapore Law Gazette in 
September 2007, after the three sets of “Remarks” had been delivered in 
Durai, but before the writing of the Grounds of Decision in December 
2007. In writing his Grounds of Decision, the trial judge in Durai 
appears to have felt compelled to address some of these criticisms in 
writing multiple judgments and to explain the reasons for his writing 
the earlier three “Remarks” or judgments.
22 
V.  The trial judge’s explanation 
15  According to the trial judge, the writing of his three earlier 
“Remarks” was done “in accordance with current practice in the 
Subordinate Courts”.
23 He also gave other reasons. As the decisions of 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in Goh Lai Wak v PP
24 and Anyanwu v 
PP
25 against the writing of multiple judgments were in reference to High 
Court decisions, “it may be possible to argue”, the judge reasoned, that 
these decisions applied only to the High Court. In this line of reasoning 
the trial judge overlooked the fact that in Goh Lai Wak v PP, the Court of 
Appeal approved the Malaysian cases of Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP
26 and 
Lorraine Phylis Cohen v PP,
27 both decisions on the equivalent of s 217 of 
our Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits a lower court from 
altering or reviewing a judgment. 
16  The trial judge next referred to ss 217 to 219 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code.
28 He opined that “none of these provisions directly 
prohibit the giving of reasons before supplying grounds of decision”.
29 
                                                                        
22  [2007] SGDC 334 at [149]–[158]. 
23  [2007] SGDC 334 at [149]. 
24  [1994] 1 SLR 748 a decision on s  46 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 
(Cap 322, 1993 Reprint). 
25  [1994] 2 SLR 42. 
26  [1956] MLJ 206. 
27  [1989] 2 MLJ 288 where the Malaysian Supreme Court ordered that only the first 
judgment be included in the record although this judgment had only dealt with the 
prosecution case as in the case of the first set of “Remarks” in Durai. 
28  Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed. Section 217 prohibits the alteration or review of judgments 
by the lower court, s 218 requires the explanation of judgment to the appellant and 
s  219 provides for the original written judgment to be filed with the record of 
proceedings. 
29  [2007] SGDC at [154]. (2009) 21 SAcLJ  Multiple Judgments  597 
 
To be fair, he rightly conceded that there were indeed judgments in both 
Singapore and Malaysia which were against such a view.
30 
17  Additionally, the trial judge took the view that the prohibition 
in s 217 against altering or reviewing a judgment was only “concerned 
with the alteration of the verdict or sentence”, rather than the “grounds”. 
The suggestion was that his earlier “Remarks” were all “reasons” or 
“grounds” for various decisions and not judgments incapable of review 
under s 217 of the Code. Finally, according to the trial judge, even if a 
judge’s reasons for his decision (like his three “Remarks”) were to be 
construed as judgments, they could be altered or reviewed if the judge 
indicates that a final judgment will follow. In other words, such 
qualifiers were sufficient to permit the writing of multiple judgments 
before the final Grounds of Decision. 
18  If the trial judge were right, a judge could give different reasons 
in various judgments for making judicial determinations so long as he 
reserved the right to give a “final” Grounds of Decision should the need 
arise. Such a position would be wholly untenable and in total disregard 
of the provisions of s 217 of the Code which seeks to ensure finality of 
court judgments. 
19  Equally unacceptable was the trial judge’s reasoning that the 
writing of multiple judgments is permissible because the Code does not 
expressly prohibit this. Would the writing of many judgments in one 
case have even been within the reasonable contemplation of the drafters 
of the Code to make them want to provide for a prohibition of such 
judicial conduct? Why indeed would any judge, who has to constantly 
write judgments in between hearing cases on busy court schedules, want 
to write multiple judgments in any one case? Unless, of course, he 
entertains second thoughts or wishes to bolster the reasons given in an 
earlier judgment. And it is such an alteration or review that s 217(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Code expressly prohibits. 
20  The consequences of writing double judgments have been 
documented elsewhere.
31 There is always the possibility of 
inconsistencies in the trial judge’s findings and in his analysis of 
evidence or contradictions between judgments. More importantly, it 
raises questions as to judicial credibility and the danger of ex post facto 
                                                                        
30  Reference was made to the Malaysian decisions of Habee Bur Rahman [1971] 
2 MLJ 194, Loh Kwang Seang [1960] MLJ 271, and to the Singapore decisions in 
PP v Johannes Van Damme [1993] SGHC 90 and PP v John Thien, briefly noted in 
[1964] MLJ ci. See also Chiaw Wai Onn v PP [1997] 3 SLR 445. 
31  S Chandra Mohan, “The CrimsonLogic Case: When is a Judgment Not a Judgment” 
Law Gazette, September 2007, 23 at 27 and 28. 598  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
justification.  These have been recognised by the Malaysian Supreme 
Court:
32 
Supplementary grounds after a written judgment has been delivered 
may well affect judicial credibility because they could easily be 
mistaken for the wisdom of hindsight rather than representing the 
actual decision-making process. Consequently, it is undesirable to have 
two written judgments in the same case. 
21  The  Durai c a s e  m a y  w e l l  b e  a n  e x c e l l e n t  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
wisdom of these words. 
VI.  The appellate judge’s decisions 
22  Justice Tay Yong Kwang rightly rejected
33 the trial judge’s main 
justification for writing the three earlier judgments titled “Remarks” in 
addition to the Grounds of Decision. He noted that all the three sets of 
“Remarks”, totalling 46 pages, “adopt the general format of formal 
judgments or grounds of decision” and that they “set out in detail the 
facts, the contentions, the decision and the reasons for the decision”.
34 
Tay J held that “in form and in substance therefore, the Remarks are 
judgments or grounds of decision”.
35 The fact that the “Remarks” had a 
qualifier to the effect that they were not meant to be full grounds of 
decision made no difference. 
23  Beyond this, the judge did not specifically deal with all the 
reasons for the trial judge’s perceived entitlement to the writing of 
multiple judgments. Instead, he was content to refer in extenso to that 
part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Goh Lai Wak v PP
36 
where Yong CJ quoted Lee Hun Hoe CJ in Cohen Phylis v PP:
37 
Lee Hun Hoe CJ, in delivering the judgment of the court, held at 
p 289F: 
Since there was already a written judgment, signed and 
delivered on 1 September 1987, no second written judgment 
or grounds of decision could be delivered subsequently to 
supplement the first judgment. We do not think it is 
competent for the learned judge to supplement the first 
judgment by delivering a second judgment or grounds of 
                                                                        
32  Sykt Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan Bhd v 
Majilis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1996] 2 MLJ 697 followed in Dr Chin Yoon 
Hiap v Ng Eu Khoon [1998] 1 MLJ 57. 
33  Unreported Magistrate’s Appeal No 126/2007/01. 
34  Page 1, para 2 of the Judgment dated 30 May 2008. 
35  Page 1, para 4 of the Judgment dated 30 May 2008. 
36  [1994] 1 SLR 748 at [32]–[34]. 
37  [1989] 2 MLJ 288. (2009) 21 SAcLJ  Multiple Judgments  599 
 
decision. This is clearly against fundamental principle as is 
normally understood. 
Later, at p 289C, in adopting Mathew CJ’s judgment in Ankur Nath,
38 
Lee Hun Hoe CJ said: 
We support the sentiments expressed therein since the said 
provision (s 21(1) of the Courts Ordinance 1948) is similar 
in substance to s 52(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. 
We consider it wrong in principle to allow a judge to 
supplement his original judgment by a second judgment. If 
we allow this, what is there to prevent a third or fourth 
judgment to supplement an earlier judgment. 
We agree with the propositions enunciated in Ankur Nath and 
Lorraine Phylis Cohen. A judge cannot subsequently give his grounds 
of decision if he has already delivered a prior judgment at the 
conclusion of the trial which contains his reasons for convicting the 
accused. This principle does not affect the operation of s 218 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) which provides that a judgment 
shall be explained to the accused. There cannot be any objection to a 
judge providing briefly at the conclusion of a trial an outline of the 
issues before him and the evidence on them, and to indicate briefly, 
without reasons, his findings on them. In such circumstances, there 
should be no objection if subsequent written grounds of decision are 
delivered in which the evidence is fully reviewed and the judge’s 
detailed reasons or grounds for his findings are comprehensively 
recorded. 
[footnote added] 
24  Tay J noted that “this principle” was affirmed by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal almost immediately in Anyanwu v PP.
39 A more positive 
statement then followed:
40 
I do not see why this principle which applies to the High Court should 
not apply to the Subordinate Courts. 
I therefore agree with the appellant that the DJ should not have 
supplemented his 3 remarks given at the various stages of the trial, 
notwithstanding his qualifier and reservation of a right to give ‘full 
grounds’. 
25  The mere reference in this context to the Court of Appeal’s 
doubtful comment based on s 218 of the Code,
41 as providing a limited 
                                                                        
38  [1956] MLJ 205. 
39  [1994] 2 SLR 46 at [19]–[20]. 
40  At paras 7 and 8 of the unreported judgment. 
41  The use of s 218 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) for this 
purpose is questionable as can be seen from the subsequent case of Anyanwu v PP 
[1994] 2 SLR 46. Section 218 only requires the judge to explain to the accused his 
decision of an acquittal or conviction and, if the accused so desires, to provide him 
(cont’d on the next page) 600  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
exception to the rule of prohibition against altering judgments, is 
difficult to understand.
42 The appellate judge did not take this 
opportunity to comment upon nor express any judicial disapproval of 
“the current practice in the subordinate courts”
43 to write more than one 
judgment. This was unfortunate given that the High Court has a 
supervisory jurisdiction over the Subordinate Courts and that this was 
the first opportunity the High Court had of reviewing the recent, and 
a p p a r e n t l y  c o m m o n ,  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  l o w e r  c o u r t s  o f  
writing multiple judgments. 
VII.  The difficulties with the judgment 
26  The difficulty with the High Court judgment in the Durai 
appeal lies, firstly, with the total inconsequence of the judge’s decision in 
allowing the appellant’s sixth ground of appeal and in his ruling that the 
multiple judgments written by the trial judge fell foul of the law. In view 
of Tay J’s finding that the three “Remarks” were indeed judgments, and 
having reiterated that the proscription against the alteration and review 
of judgments, enshrined in s  217 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
44 
applied to subordinate court judgments, should the judge then not have 
disregarded the subsequent Grounds of Decision and determined the 
appeal solely on the basis of the earlier three judgments? That was what 
was done in PP v John Thien
45 by Wee Chong Jin CJ and in a number of 
Malaysian decisions.
46 Many of these authorities were brought to the 
attention of the judge in the course of the appeal.
47 
27  In Loh Kwang Seng v PP,
48 Rigby J opined that the court must 
consider the original judgment as it stands and exclude any 
consideration of the parts subsequently added. In Low Ah Thit v PP,
49 
                                                                                                                                
with a translation in his own language. The purpose of the section is to ensure that 
the accused understands the judgment or rulings made against him: Mallal’s 
Criminal Procedure Code (Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 5th Ed) at para 8904. 
Section 218 does not require the judge to state his reasons for his decision. 
42  For a fuller discussion, see S Chandra Mohan, “The CrimsonLogic Case: When is a 
Judgment Not a Judgment” Law Gazette, September 2007, 23. 
43  According to the trial judge: [2007] SGDC 334 at [149]. 
44  Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed. 
45  [1964] MLJ ci, followed in PP v Johannes Van Damme [1993] SGHC 90 and Low 
Ah Thit v PP [1992] 2 CLJ 1223. The second judgment was expunged from the 
records of the case. 
46  See, for example, Habee Bur Rahman v PP [1971] 2 MLJ 194; Nathan v PP [1972] 
2 MLJ  101;  Loh Kwang Seang v PP [1960] MLJ 271; Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP 
[1956] MLJ 206, Low Ah Thit v PP [1992] 2 CLJ 1223; PP v Yap Thiang Wah [1992] 
MLJ 206; Lorraine Phyliss Cohen v PP [1989] 2 MLJ 288. 
47 See the Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant (Magistrate’ Appeal 
No 126/2007/01), dated 21 May 2008, at pp 67–68. 
48  [1960] MLJ 271. 
49  [1992] 2 CLJ 1223. (2009) 21 SAcLJ  Multiple Judgments  601 
 
a more recent authority, Chong Siew Fai J held that the existence of two 
judgments “does not render the proceedings bad or void” but went on to 
state that the “appropriate course to take (and is the one which I would 
here adopt) is to ignore the second judgment and give whatever regard 
and weight to the first”.
50 The Malaysian Court of Appeal has also held
51 
that, even in civil cases, the second of two judgments dealing with the 
same issues should be regarded as a nullity. Such a consideration need 
not always result in the original judgment of the trial court being set 
aside if the remaining judgment is capable of supporting it.
52 
28  Clearly, both legal authority and the logical consequence of his 
decisions on the sixth ground of appeal should have led the appellate 
judge to disregard the grounds of decision and to instead reconsider the 
trial judge’s contemporaneous evaluation of the prosecution evidence as 
contained in the original judgments entitled “Remarks”. Had the 
appellate judge done so, would he still have come to the conclusion that 
the trial judge was correct in deciding that the case against the appellant 
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt? That question will always 
remain unanswered. 
29  The greater difficulty with the judgment is the manner in which 
the appellate court finally dealt with the trial judge’s violations of s 217 
of the Code. The appellate judge’s final conclusion was that there was 
“no suggestion that the DJ has departed from his earlier reasoning or 
that he has changed anything material in his grounds of decision of 17 
December 2007” [emphasis added].
53 Consequently, he held that the 
error of the trial judge in writing multiple judgments in breach of the 
law was a mere irregularity which did not occasion a failure of justice 
sufficient to vitiate the District Judge’s decision. 
30  The appellate judge’s conclusion that there was “no suggestion” 
that the trial judge had departed from his earlier reasoning or changed 
anything material in his subsequent grounds of decision (his fourth 
judgment in the case) is again difficult to understand. On the contrary, 
it had been strenuously submitted on behalf of the appellant, that what 
the trial judge had done in his 63-page Grounds of Decision of 
17  December 2007 was to supplement his earlier detailed judgments 
(entitled “Remarks”), by another 15 pages. Examples were given to the 
                                                                        
50  [1992] 2 CLJ 1223 at 1224. 
51  Dr Chin Yoon Hiap v Ng Eu Khoon [1998] 1 MLJ 57; Sykt Bekerjsama-Sama 
Serbaguna Sungai Gelukor Dengan Tanggungan Bhd Majilis Perbandaran Pulau 
Pinang [1996] 2 MLJ 697 following criminal cases such as Habee Bur Rahman v PP 
[1971] 2 MLJ 194 and Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP [1956] MLJ 206. 
52  See, for example, Habee Bur Rahman v PP [1971] 2 MLJ 194. 
53  Paragraph 9 of the unreported judgment. 602  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
judge during the hearing of the appeal of “critical additions”
54 or 
embellishments that the trial judge had made in the Grounds of 
Decision he had written, six months after the last of three earlier 
judgments. Some 27 additional paragraphs in the trial judge’s Grounds 
of Decision were brought to the appellate judge’s attention, as evidence 
of the trial judge clearly “supplementing his reasons (given earlier) for 
his calling the defence of the appellant and convicting him”.
55 
31  It must be remembered that the entire defence, many of the 
grounds of appeal and the principal submissions during the appeal were 
that the principal prosecution witness (David Tan) was a completely 
unreliable witness whose evidence was riddled with contractions and 
hence ought not to have been believed by the trial judge. Indeed, the 
trial judge’s treatment and “inexplicable”
56 acceptance of the evidence of 
David Tan, an acknowledged accomplice, was the main subject of the 
appeal. 
32  It was therefore submitted to Tay J, in the course of the appeal, 
that there were significant additions in the trial judge’s Grounds of 
Decision (or “alterations”, to use the term in s 217 of the Code). These 
were said to “relate to his treatment of David Tan’s evidence in relation 
to”:
57 
(1)  The multiple versions of David Tan’s evidence in Court; 
(2)  The different sets of statements made by David Tan to 
the CPIB; 
(3)  David Tan’s statements to the CAD and KPMG; 
(4)  The so-called core untainted evidence of David Tan; 
(5)  The inferences that the trial judge drew on the core untainted 
evidence of David Tan; and 
(6)  Inferences as to the intention of the Appellant. 
33  The trial judge, it was further submitted on the appellant’s 
behalf, had clearly “augmented his Grounds of Decision by giving 
further reasons or grounds for his findings in relation to the critical 
averments in the charge, in clear contravention of section 217 of the 
                                                                        
54  Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant (Magistrate’ Appeal No 126/2007/01), dated 
21 May 2008, at para 217. 
55  Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant (Magistrate’ Appeal No 126/2007/01), dated 
21 May 2008, at para 217. 
56  Skeletal Submissions of the Appellant (Magistrate’ Appeal No 126/2007/01), dated 
21 May 2008, at paras 142 and 144. A number of pages of the detailed 85-page 
skeletal submissions were devoted to the unreliability of Tan’s conflicting evidence 
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Criminal Procedure Code”.
58 In the circumstances, Tay  J’s conclusion 
that “there is no suggestion that the DJ has departed from his earlier 
reasoning or that he has changed anything material in his grounds of 
decision”,
59 with respect, is rather astonishing. 
34  As was held in Loh Kwang Seang v PP,
60 the presence of more 
than one judgment does not necessarily constitute a miscarriage of 
justice to vitiate a trial. This was followed in Habee Bur Rahman v PP,
61 
where the Kuching High Court ruled that it was not permissible for a 
court “to supplement the grounds of decision or to amplify them in any 
way”, disregarded the second judgment but upheld the conviction on the 
basis of the original judgment. But if the remaining judgment is 
defective or inadequate, the court may well find that the trial judge’s 
decision cannot be supported and may quash the conviction. In Ankur 
Nath Ganguli v PP,
62 the Federation of Malaya Court of Appeal similarly 
considered only the original oral judgment that was delivered, instead of 
the Grounds of Decision written later, and found the judgment defective 
in the absence of consideration of the accomplice evidence. It was this 
additional but important inquiry that the appellate judge failed to make 
in the Durai case, despite allowing the sixth ground of appeal. 
35  Finally, an appeal is essentially a rehearing and the appellate 
court may re-examine the whole case and the entire decision of the 
lower court in order to determine if the findings of the trial court are 
correct.
63 There was, hence, nothing to preclude the appellate judge in 
the Durai case from re-examining the evidence that was before the trial 
judge ab initio, regardless of the multiple judgments, and to uphold the 
conviction if it was warranted by the evidence.
64 But that too was not the 
path the appellate judge took in this appeal. 
VIII.  Conclusion 
36  The Durai appeal case may have helped to finally remove any 
doubts of the lower Judiciary as to the impropriety of writing multiple 
judgments in a case. Unfortunately, the brief judgment has not 
emphasised, as other earlier authorities have done, that there may be 
adverse consequences if the rule prohibiting the alteration or review of 
judgments is breached. For all judges, there still remains the question of 
                                                                        
58  Appellant’s Skeletal Arguments, at pp 71–72, para 221. 
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60  [1960] MLJ 271 followed in Habee Bur Rahman v PP [1971] 2 MLJ 194. 
61  [1971] 2 MLJ 194. 
62  [1956] MLJ 288. 
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what is to be made of the suggestion by the Court of Appeal in Goh Lai 
Wak v PP,
65 that because a judgment has to be explained to the accused 
under s  218 of the Criminal Procedure Code
66 “there cannot be any 
objection to a judge providing briefly at the conclusion of a trial an 
outline of the issues before him and the evidence on them, and to 
indicate briefly, without reasons, his findings on them”. As has been 
observed earlier in this note, that incorrect interpretation of s 218 may 
have contributed to the problem of multiple judgments.
67 The current 
Court of Appeal will no doubt deal with this matter at the earliest 
opportunity. 
37  The Durai case at least demonstrates the importance of a plainly 
common sense view. It is that multiple judgments are best avoided by 
judges in view of the possibility of complaints of inconsistencies and 
contradictions in a judge’s findings and in his analysis of the evidence 
between his various judgments. More importantly, alterations of 
judgments strike at the very core of finality of judicial decisions, which 
is of fundamental importance to criminal justice as the drafters of the 
Code recognised in 1900.
68 
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